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Post Info TOPIC: Mining Operations on the Western Front **Article** Part 1 of 6
Tim R


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Mining Operations on the Western Front **Article** Part 1 of 6
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Hello Gentleman

 I have attached an article on the Mining Operations on the Western Front

I do not take credit for this information, I found it on a Austrian Military Forum, and thought someone may be interested. I do not know who put this information together, but it is rather interesting.

All the Best

Tim R

Mining Operations on the Western Front Introduction 

The use of mining as a weapon of war has a long history. Used almost exclusively against heavily fortified places, the art of military mining for offensive purposes was rendered obsolete with the advent of more accurate and powerful artillery pieces that could raze isolated fortifications from a distance. Wars fought throughout the18th and 19th centuries had been conducted, for the most part, with large massed armies over open plains with each side seeking to gain a tactical advantage. With this in mind, mining on the Western Front during 1914-1918 was, therefore, made possible for two main reasons. Firstly, the static nature of the front itself and the close 'proximity of the opposing lines'; (1) secondly, the length of time such conditions prevailed. The overarching aim of this study is to look at the extent to which mining, in a more general sense, aided the war effort and to examine whether or not more could have been achieved in the earlier stages. It will also look at what legacies, if any, military mining left for use in future wars. The principal focus will therefore concentrate on three main considerations, outlined in the chapter headings: Efficacy, Effects on morale, Opportunity for breakthrough.


The first chapter will deal with the reason why specialised tunnelling companies were needed, distinct from the regular Royal Engineers. It looks at the problems they encountered while carrying out their work such as geographical/geological problems; equipment and supply; enemy counter-mining; mine rescue and command structure. The second chapter will deal with the effects mining had on morale, not only of the infantry manning the front line trenches who suffered directly from a mine explosion, but also the tunnellers themselves and the psychological strain that this placed on them both and how this in turn affected their performances in their specific fields. The third chapter will examine the opportunities that mining may have had in producing a breakthrough in the enemy lines and will look at three major mining offensives [and mining in the Vimy Ridge sector] by British and Commonwealth miners during the war. It will also look at the possibilities missed, such as the omission of mining for the Loos offensive. Greater time has been given in this chapter to the Messines operation not simply because this was the highlight of the tunnellers war, but because of the nature of the operation itself. This was an all-arms operation in which it was recognised, by those planning the offensive, that mining played a vital and pivotal role. The underground operation was completed in relative secrecy despite the fact that some of the mines had been in position and undetected for over a year. Its success was an object lesson in the efficacy of mining and, arguably, proved the miners' worth.


There are very few dedicated secondary sources on the subject of military mining during The Great War and those that are available were published some time ago. Many general texts make mention of mining operations but none of these go into any great detail despite the fact that for every major operation over ground there was an equal, perhaps disproportionate effort underground to aid the assault.

The initial problem in carrying out such a study appeared to be a lack of secondary and primary source material.  A preliminary search however, proved that this was not in fact the case. Much of the primary source material was gained from the Public Records Office at Kew in London. The Tunnelling Companies themselves kept weekly records of mining activity which included sketches and ideas on overcoming particular mining problems. By cross-referencing these reports with other written works it is possible to gain a more accurate picture of certain events. For example, the Official History states that only five mines were laid beneath Hill 60 for the assault on 17 April 1915. The reports from 171 Company states that six were in fact prepared and fired, an account supported by Capt. Grant Grieve in his work.

There are also the Official Histories, which, despite the conflicting view highlighted above, proved an invaluable source of information and a foundation on which to begin. In particular Military Operations: France and Belgium.Vol. 1. 1915; Vol. 1. 1916 and Vol. 2. 1917. proved extremely useful.


There are a small number of dedicated publications on the subject of tunnelling. Tunnellers, written by Capt. W. Grant Grieve and Bernard Newman, (1936), is more of an unofficial history of tunnelling companies and gives a comprehensive account of mining activities on the Western Front (2)  from its beginnings in late 1914 until the restoration of the war of movement in March 1918. It charts many of the problems encountered by the tunnellers and their progress, culminating in the largest mining offensive of the war - the assault on Messines Ridge. It also details the other duties that the tunnellers performed. Tunnelling companies did not only mine but also undertook tasks such as the building and repairing of dugouts, the repairing of trench systems, roads and bridges and attended to booby traps, particularly during 1918. This account relays these activities in fine detail and Captain Grant Grieve was himself a tunneller during the war.

A later account is that produced by Alexander Barrie entitled The War Underground, (1961). Like Tunnellers this is a comprehensive account of British and Commonwealth mining activities but also one which looks at the activities of German engineers in their effort to undermine British positions. It examines the many problems encountered and the psychological effects that mining had on the infantry and tunnellers on both sides.


There is also a specific company account written by Capt. H. W. Graham: The Life of a Tunnelling Company, (1927), which charts the daily life of 185th Tunnelling Company between 1916 and 1918 and gives a excellent insight into the running of a tunnelling company and its trials and tribulations.

There are in addition some excellent articles in various journals, some by those directly involved and others covering  geological and geographical factors. The greater weight will come from publications mentioned above  in conjunction with primary source material gathered from the Public Records Office with the journal articles and other secondary works acting in support.  


It is important, though perhaps obvious, to mention at this point that mining on the Western Front was not the reserve of British and Commonwealth forces and that their contribution was but one part. The French were actively mining in their sector of the front too and their history remains to be revealed, though there are certain publications that have become available in recent years. A large volume published in 1997 is the diary of Louis Barthas, a French tunneller with the 296th Regiment. This work follows his service and experiences as a tunneller from early 1915 until the end of the war in which he sees service at Notre-Dame-de-Lorette, Verdun, and the Somme and ends his war in the forests of the Argonne (3). The Germans too mined extensively though they will be covered to some extent within this study.


While mining can be an extremely technical subject to cover, this study will only involve such technicalities that are necessary to convey specific points. The dimensions, length and depth, number of branches made from one gallery, the amount of explosive material and type for each mine would not be possible or necessary for a work of this kind given the limited space available. Where points or explanations would detract from the text these will be included in various appendices that will be clearly marked. Commonwealth tunnelling companies began to see service on the Western Front at the beginning of 1916, the Australians and Canadians commencing and maintaining mines in the Ypres and Messines sectors. These immediately came under the command of British G.H.Q. and for brevity the term British is mostly used to encompass the tunnelling force as a whole.


Of the three main texts mentioned above that deal directly with mining during the First World War, only one is on general sale to the public through main stream bookshops and no new works have been published since 1961. Capt. Graham's work was privately printed and is extremely difficult to obtain. The work of Grant Grieve and Newman is available through Naval and Military Press and may not be known to the general reader. While it is not possible or even practical to include every aspect of mining during this period, those that have been chosen are perhaps fundamental to the understanding of what mining hoped to achieve.



________________________________________________________________________________

(1). Terriane, J. (1982). White Heat: The New Warfare 1914-1918. London. Leo Cooper. P. 144.

(2). An account is also given on mining activity carried out on the Gallipoli peninsula.

(3). Barthas, Louis. (1997).  Les Carnets de Louis Barthas, Tonnelier 1914-1918. Introduction and postface de Remi
Cazals. Paris. Editions la Découverte.

-- Edited by Tim R at 19:51, 2007-01-23

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RE: Mining Operations on the Western Front **Article** Part 3
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Effects on morale


One of the most fundamental factors of any effective fighting force is the morale of the men that make up that force. The degree to which this is felt can determine an army's ability to fight or to defend its position. Perhaps the most extreme example of the extent to which low morale can render an army ineffective are the mutinies that occurred within the French Army at the end of April 1917. In reaction to the disastrous 'Nivelle offensive', drunkenness became rife, there was widespread absenteeism and a general refusal to obey orders. Whole divisions refused to go into the front-line, particularly to take the offensive and as a result the French Army had to maintain a defensive posture until 1918 when American forces would arrive in sufficient numbers to lend practical help (1). The aim of this chapter is to look at how mining operations, and the very nature of mining itself, affected the morale of those manning front line positions on both sides; how this in turn determined the attitude of ordinary soldiers and their commanders towards tunnellers and mining in general; the morale of the tunnellers themselves; to look at the positive aspects, such as the evolution of more sophisticated listening devices that defensive mining required; and the methods and systems employed to give protection to front line positions.


First honours in mine warfare, as discussed in the previous chapter, went to the Germans when, on 20 December 1914, ten mines were fired underneath the Sirhind Brigade ± that was holding the front near Festubert. Taken completely by surprise and 'shocked' by the force of the explosions those troops that had survived the initial blast rushed from the trenches towards the rear. The effect on the morale of the surviving troops, and on others as word spread, was such that some units refused to return to the front (2). As a result the whole of the Indian Corps had to be withdrawn to reserve, draining already depleted and much-needed manpower. The German blows had introduced a new more terrifying aspect to the war; 'above, death came suddenly; below, his approach was slow and stealthy, and the waiting time was enough to shake the stoutest heart' (3). Tunnelling had robbed the infantry of the little security that a trench could provide (4). If a soldier stayed below the parapet of a trench it offered some protection from small arms fire and, in the early stages at least, some protection from artillery with the exception of a direct hit. An assault, with the exception of trench raids that used small units of men, was usually precipitated by an artillery bombardment. In this way an attack was expected and measures could be taken to repel the assault. Mining, if undetected, would catch those manning front-line trenches totally unprepared, leaving those who were not killed disorientated and demoralised, all of which aided the inevitable infantry assault that followed.


Initially, the general attitude of the British troops towards tunnellers was mixed. In areas where there was no known mining activity tunnelling companies were not particularly welcomed and in some instances were greeted with some hostility for fear that this would result in enemy mining of their positions. In places where the sounds of mining activity were detected they were greeted as saviours. Despite the call from the front for protection against enemy mining there was a distinct lack of co-operation between the infantry and tunnellers, particularly at command level. As British and Commonwealth troops moved further south to take over positions previously occupied by the French in early 1916, trench systems were reorganised. 'New trenches would be dug to meet the surface conditions, without any reference to the tactical situation underground as ascertained by the tunnellers, and were immediately blown up by enemy mines over which they were constructed' (5). Blame and counter blame was often the result.


1915 was a particularly troublesome year for the tunnelling companies. German sappers had taken and had maintained the initiative, which would not be wrested from them until 1916-17. As a result the tunnellers were consistently on the defensive in order to protect the infantry from offensive mining. The constant fear the infantry had of being undermined only increased the burden of the already hard-pressed tunnelling officers as one contemporary, himself a tunnelling officer, observed. 'For the hundreds who are killed, buried, or injured from enemy mines there are thousands who suffer a mental strain from the mere suspicion of their existence' (6). This constant fear produced persistent demands for tunnelling officers to investigate any noise that may be attributed to enemy mining. Frequently there would be a rational explanation for the sounds that had been heard which, with the benefit of hindsight and the passage of time, seem comical. One report of mining activity turned out to be a 'brood of young mice squeaking in their nest behind the timbers of a dugout. The croaking of frogs in a pond in the garden of a house used as a Brigade Headquarters was thought to be the sound of an enemy boring machine until suspicion was allayed by a Tunnelling Officer' (7). Tunnelling Officers were in short supply and this activity, necessary as it was to ease the minds of those in vulnerable positions, stretched the already hard pressed tunnelling companies. However, as they became more organised and experienced, listening was usually given over to NCOs or sufficiently trained sappers.


In order to fully utilise those tunnellers involved in determining whether or not enemy mining was actually taking place, there was a need to find suitable and more accurate listening devices rather than relying on the unaided ear. The infantry themselves used a large drum which would be sunk into the floor of a trench and filled to the brim with water. A soldier would then lie down in the mud soaked trench and place his ear into the freezing water and listen for sounds of enemy mining activity, keeping his ear in the water for as long as he could bear. The problem with this was that they were not trained in how to distinguish between the sounds that mining produces and the every day noises of life at the front. The 'Metropolitan Water Board' supplied one of the first listening aids that the tunnellers themselves used. This consisted of a length of stick that was used in detecting leaks from water pipes. The tunneller would push the stick into the ground and would hold the exposed portion in-between his teeth in order to feel the vibrations from below. Like the former, this method of listening was unreliable, as it was difficult to differentiate between the sound of mining and that of artillery bombardment nearby. An improvised listening device was used in the form of a French Army water bottle. 'Suitable on account of its round, flat shape, the bottle was filled with water, and to the stopper was fitted a rubber tube, an ear piece being attached to the other end' (8). Once experience was gained in its use this became reasonably reliable.


By the beginning of 1916 there were two specifically designed listening aids in use with the tunnelling companies. The first and most simple device of the two was the French-made geophone. This 'consisted of two wooden discs filled with mercury, faced with mica and bearing nipples to which a stethoscope could be attached' (9). The geophone had the ability to amplify the sounds of mining without increasing other background noises to the same degree. It was also possible, by manoeuvring the discs around, to gain a reliable bearing and direction of an approaching enemy mine. It was also, as one Tunnelling Officer argued, 'a great aid in reassuring infantry who heard noises' (10) by allowing the men concerned to use the instrument for themselves while at the same time explaining what the various noises were. The second listening aid came into service in March 1916. Developed by the Western Electric Company 'this battery-powered device picked up earth tremors and converted them into electrical impulses, which were then fed to a telephone receiver' (11). Theoretically, accurate readings of 'direction' and range should have been possible using this machine. However, in reality it did not live up to the expectations placed upon it and it was useful only in the fact that it could confirm that mining was actually taking place. Nevertheless both these listening aids greatly increased the chances of early detection than had previously been possible and enabled those tunnellers sufficiently trained in the use of this equipment some time to prepare counter measures.


As tunnels became longer and more complex air to those men working at the face became a major problem. Tools and equipment at the outset of mining operations were old and antiquated; the majority of which dated from the Crimean War and had been in storage since 1856. The hand-cranked air pumps were noisy and could not deliver enough air. After a short period working at the face the tunnellers became aware of their own laboured breathing which made an 'extraordinary roaring noise' in the silent tunnels' (12). As a result men suffered from fatigue and appalling headaches at the end of each shift and the air pumps were replaced by blacksmiths bellows attached to toughened hoses until silent electric pumps came into service Ŧ.


The morale of the tunnellers themselves was tested on an almost daily basis. Though many were experienced miners, the tunnels they now worked in were much smaller and more confining. The added dimension of course was the war itself. Mining in low, narrow tunnels with outdated equipment was bad enough. The danger was increased dramatically by conditions of war (13). German artillery frequently sought out front-line trenches in the hope of destroying a mine entrance. The destruction of a shaft entrance would entomb those working in the tunnel and cut off their air supply resulting in a major rescue operation. More nerve racking still was the possibility that at any time they may run into an enemy countermine. Once sounds of enemy mining were detected or a breakthrough was made it became a life or death race as to which side could destroy the other's gallery first. Using a portable charge known as a camouflet, this would destroy a large section of the enemy tunnel with out breaking through to the surface. Frequently a breakthrough in to a German mine resulted in underground combat with small arms fire. Charges were often discovered laid and ready for detonation and an attempt would be made to remove the charge before it could be fired. This placed a great strain on the part of the man undertaking this task as detection by the enemy meant almost certain death, as they would immediately fire their charge. In many instances the removal of such devices was done with great speed and success and more than a little courage on the part of those involved. Morale was also affected to some degree by the uncoordinated efforts of tunnelling companies in the early stages, which was tactical rather than strategic. This was rectified with the reorganisation of the tunnelling force at the beginning of 1916 and its incorporation into a strategic framework.


The British and commonwealth tunnellers suffered from a problem not found amongst the sappers of the German Army on the Western Front. This problem was a lack of unified command and working practices. On the allied side three national armies, the British, French and Belgian each manned the front with their respective colonial and commonwealth troops. As the war continued into 1916 British and Commonwealth armies began to take over more of the front line to ease the burden of the French *. This brought with it several problems. Up to this point mining on the British side had been conducted through the clay subsoil of the north. They now moved into areas made up of chalk, which required different techniques. The German tunnellers in these areas further south had 'a well-developed mining system on two levels' (14) and therefore held the advantage. Some of the tunnels inherited from the French were in poor condition, made worse by the 'innumerable small charges which had been fired by them' (15). In many instances a new defensive system had to be driven from unfamiliar galleries to greater depths in an attempt to re-dress the balance.


The effects that mining had on the morale of the infantry and tunnellers alike was not a one sided affair. The strain, tension and fear were also felt on the German side and on occasion had greater consequences. Surprise played a significant part in increased demoralisation prior to an assault and greatly aided the attacking force. At all levels nowhere was the surprise more complete than the Messines operation on 7 June 1917. Writing his memoirs shortly after the war General Ludendorff commented on this action. ' . . . All had been quiet, and no sound of underground work on the part of the enemy could be heard at our listening posts. The mines must, therefore, have been in position long before. The morale effect of the explosions was simply staggering. At several points our troops fell back before the onslaught of the enemy infantry' (16). The devastating and decisive effect that this had upon the German forces was such that they were unable to offer any substantial defence against the infantry assault that followed. This can be seen in the number of prisoners taken within the first few hours of the operation, which amounted to some 7,000 with thousands more, killed, wounded or missing. The director of Army Intelligence, Brigadier-General Sir John Charteris, interviewed many of the captured German officers for himself. 'They reported that the mines "so upset their men's nerves that they offered no resistance"' (17). There were also further repercussions for the German geologist engaged in the area. The day following the Messines operation a German General arrived at the Head Quarters of the geologists and was furious that he had not been informed that the enemy had been mining underneath the German mining system. They had informed him previously that mining below their system was impossible and several attempts were made to locate any British galleries that may be in existence. This met with little success and only served to confirm to them that no effective mining system was in place. Following this meeting the General ordered all those over the age of forty to return to Berlin and those under forty he sent to the front (18).


The effects of mining on the morale of the fighting men of both sides maybe seen, not only in the physical aspects that a mine explosion produced, which usually killed or buried (sometimes alive) the occupants of the trench under which it was fired, but more in a psychological sense. The fear of being mined by the enemy was, arguably, out of all proportion to the number of mines fired when compared to the vast quantities of artillery and trench mortar shells that rained down on the respective lines on a daily basis. The fear was of the unknown. Soldiers knew where they were with artillery bombardments. Mines were unseen until the moment of detonation and men were constantly preoccupied that tunnelling was taking place whenever they heard noises beneath them. For British tunnellers the problems were more widespread. In the first instance they were effectively playing catch up as the Germans already had in place a mining organisation and had begun mining on a definite system. Poor equipment and a lack of co-ordinated command resulted in a mainly defensive system during most of 1915 and the tactical, local use of mining in general rather than its strategic use seemed to minimise the huge effort that the tunnelling companies had made. Morale within the tunnelling companies was given a lift with advances in equipment, the organisation of a specific command structure at the beginning of 1916 and its inclusion in strategic objectives in which mining was thought be an important element. They were now in a position to go over to offensive mining.

__________________________________________________________________________________

(1) Brig.-Gen. Edmonds, Sir James E. (1948). Military Operations: France and Belgium 1917. Vol. 3. PP. 26-29.

± Indian troops holding the southern extremity of the British line at that time.

(2) Barrie, A. War Underground. PP. 25-26.

(3) Grant Grieve. Tunnellers. P. 47.

(4) Dir. Mike Fox. The Underground War.

(5) Brig.-Gen. Edmonds, Sir James. E. (1932). Military Operations: France and Belgium 1916. Vol. 1. P. 74.

(6) Capt. H. D. Trounce, 'Work of Sappers and Miners in the Great War', Scribner's Magazine. Vol. 64. July-December 1918. P. 325.

(7) Grant Grieve. Tunnellers. P. 47.

(8) Grant Grieve. Tunnellers. P. 48.

(9) Barrie. War Underground. P. 138.

(10) Frayling, 'Tunnellers', Royal Engineers Journal, P. 171.

(11). Barrie, War Underground. P. 166.

(12) Barrie, War Underground. P. 50.

Ŧ See Chapter 1

(13) Grant Grieve. Tunnellers. P. 61.

* Some sectors had been taken over as early as August 1915.

(14) Grant Grieve. Tunnellers. P. 99.

(15) Brig.-Gen. Edmonds, Sir James E. (1932). P. 74.

(16) Brig.-Gen. J. A. C. Pennycuick, 'Hill 60 and the Mines at Messines', Royal Engineers Journal, Vol. 79. 1965. P. 396.

(17) Grant Grieve. Tunnellers. P. 246.

(18) Rose, 'Geology in War', P. 184.

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RE: Mining Operations on the Western Front **Article** Part 2
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Efficacy


With the war of movement giving way to a system of almost continuous trenches stretching from Switzerland to the North Sea in late November 1914, those who had predicted a long drawn out war appeared to be correct. The tactics of fire and manoeuvre were now replaced by siege warfare. With no open flank and the stopping power of modern weapons, particularly artillery and the heavy machine-gun along with the prodigious use of barbed wire, the advantage lay overwhelmingly with the defender.


Faced with this situation the idea of mining, on the British side at least, occurred, arguably, to several people simultaneously, both at home, in the Dominions and on the Western Front itself. The driving force in Britain came from John Norton Griffiths, engineering contractor and Conservative Member of Parliament for Wednesbury. He believed a system of tunnelling known as "clay kicking" or "working on the cross" , which was then being used on one of his contracts for the Manchester Corporation on a new drainage system, would be ideally suited to the conditions of Northern France and Flanders (1). The problem he faced was in convincing the War Office of the value of such an idea. However, 'the first official move in mine warfare on the British side', according to the official history of the war (2), an account also supported by Captain W. Grant Grieve (3), was that made by General Sir Henry Rawlinson on 3 December 1914 in which he called for the formation of a special battalion made up of sappers and miners already serving with the army to begin such a task. The C-in-C, Sir John French, did not agree. Mining was the reserve of the Royal Engineers and it would remain so.


The overriding factor that should perhaps be considered at this point is that the western allies, Britain and France, unlike the autocratic regimes of the central and eastern empires, were liberal democracies and so therefore the political/domestic element in the general war effort was far more acute. While Germany became a military dictatorship as the war progressed, the military of Britain and France could be reined in by the politicians who were in turn influenced by public opinion. Almost everywhere the German Army was on allied soil and so the impetus was on the Allies to drive the enemy back beyond its own borders as quickly as possible and to liberate friendly territory. As a consequence they were under pressure to maintain an offensive posture and so to this end, despite initial misgivings among the die-hards within the British Army, anything that appeared to give the initiative to the allied cause was considered. In the beginning however, mining on an organised scale would take some convincing.


Half a world away in early 1915 a professor of geology at Sydney University by the name of Edgeworth David, along with his colleague at Melbourne University, Professor Ernest Skeats, proposed the formation of a mining corps to the Federal Government of Australia when the fighting in France became 'bogged down'.This was accepted and the Australian Mining Corps was born, which became three tunnelling companies when it arrived in France and were ransferred to the General Staff (4). Edgeworth David gained a commission in the engineers and would later prove an invaluable asset to mining operations on the Western Front when he became the geological advisor to the Controller of Mines of the First, Second and Third Armies in September 1916 and later on in the Inspector of Mines office at G.H.Q. (5).


While these suggestions were being considered the German Army had forged ahead with its plans to undermine the allies and, on the 20 December 1914, exploded ten small mines under the Indian Corps holding the Givenchy-Festubert front. Ironically, British sappers, in support of a proposed offensive by the Dehra Dun Brigade, had sunk an experimental shaft and run a gallery some seventy feet deep to within thirteen feet of the German lines when a trench mortar attack had destroyed the trench in which the mine entrance was located and the mine had to be abandoned (6). The confusion and pandemonium caused by the German mines (something that will be discussed in the following chapter), acted as a catalyst. Unrealistically G.H.Q. gave instructions for R.E. field companies to begin offensive mining in retaliation to the German blows. Unfortunately the R.E. did not have the training or the manpower at the end of 1914 to undertake the task on the scale that military mining required. Nevertheless, attempts were made by the 20th Fortress Company to sink a shaft near Armentières in early January 1915. There were immense problems with water seepage and the outdated pumps could not handle it. In a further twist a sign was lifted above the German lines, which read 'in perfect English . . . "no good you mining here, it can't be done. We've tried" (7). The mine was duly abandoned.


A number of incidents in January 1915 however, made it clear to G.H.Q. that the Germans were mining 'on a definite system' (8). Reports from the infantry at the front of hearing noises underground were given support on 25 January when a deserter came into the British lines with a report that German pioneers had again undermined British front-line positions around the Cuinchy sector. Shortly afterwards some twenty small mines were blown followed by the now inevitable infantry assault upon the front-line trenches. The situation was now becoming serious and something needed to be done. However, the initiative in this regard came from the War Office and not from G.H.Q. itself.


By this time, the idea proposed by Norton Griffiths for the use of clay kickers had reached the Secretary of State for War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, who instructed him by telegram to report directly to the War Office. Once there Norton Griffiths, who by now had been granted the rank of Major in the 2nd King Edward's horse, went into a detailed explanation of his proposal for the use of such a system of mining providing the ground was suitable. He was ordered to France immediately to make an inspection and to discuss the matter with the Engineer-in Chief, Brigadier-General George Henry Fowke. Following these discussions and a meeting with the sceptical C-in-C, Sir John French, approval 'in principle' was given from the War Office for the organisation of special tunnelling companies made up of specialised volunteers and men already in service with mining knowledge. The organisation of tunnelling companies - which Norton Griffiths, Fowke, and his assistant Colonel R. N. Harvey (9) along with other engineering staff had devised - called for eight companies each made up of five officers and two-hundred and sixty nine men, with general labour being provided by infantrymen who were to be temporarily attached.


Although many front-line commanders called for protection from German mining activity, there was by no means a universal acceptance of this type of warfare among senior British Officers. There was a belief that if tunnelling could be avoided then the Germans would avoid it too. However, as the deadlock set in it became German tactical doctrine to undermine the enemy where opposing lines were one hundred yards apart or less (10). Throughout the first year of mining, referred to in the Official History as the 'first phase', there were those who thought it was a waste of manpower and material resources that could be better put to use elsewhere as the results from mining activity did little to aid the overall war effort. In the early stages, during 1915, miners were under the control of local infantry commanders who 'sometimes tried . . . to prevent mining' to maintain the status quo of their particular section of front, believing that to initiate such activity would only bring about countermining by the enemy (11). What should also be considered is that mining by its very nature can only be employed in siege conditions and pressure was on the British and French to expel the German Army from France and Belgium as quickly as possible. Mining took time and despite the static nature of the Western Front at the end of 1914 there were those who still believed that it would not last and that a break-through would occur sooner rather than later. Added to this was the fear that the introduction to the front of 'untrained, fiercely freethinking miners' (12) would quickly turn into an undisciplined mob when under fire. Such fears, however, were to prove groundless.


Despite original misgivings as to the value of mining by many senior officers at G.H.Q. its growing importance as a strategic weapon of war, given the conditions that prevailed on the Western Front, are illustrated by its rapid expansion from the eight companies originally envisaged. While it is true that the British front line had dramatically increased by the time of the Somme offensive, the size of the tunnelling force was, at this point, four times its original composition. By July 1916 its numbers had swelled to include 25 British, 3 Canadian, 3 Australian and 1 New Zealand Company. By the time of the Messines operation in June 1917 there were some 25,000 miners involved on the British side with twice that number of infantrymen in support.


Initially at least, British mining objectives were largely governed by the need to give protection to front-line positions from German underground attacks and by the lack of an organised and experienced mining force. With the exception of the Hill 60 operation (which will be looked at in more detail in chapter three) mining operations during 1915 were largely of a defensive nature. However, Captain Grant Grieve, who was a tunneller himself, argues that most of the work carried out during this period must be written off. Much of the work undertaken was 'disjointed' and 'spasmodic' and lacked 'co-ordination' (13). Nevertheless, valuable lessons had been learned. Equipment was improved and the mining organisation as a whole was restructured and centralised. A new staff structure was approved by the War Office to commence on the 1 January and the post of Inspector of Mines was created. Each Army Headquarters now had a Controller of Mines (14) and all were directly responsible to the Inspector. This greater independence meant that tunnelling companies would remain more or less in the same sector rather than having to move each time a brigade moved under the old system and so greater continuity could be achieved. Mining schools were set up to give practical experience to new arrivals not used to mining under such conditions. This was quickly followed by a mine rescue school under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Dale Logan, who had a 'special and wide ranging experience of miners' diseases and mine rescue work (15).


Equipment improved quite dramatically and was usually created or brought by officers serving within the tunnelling companies or those associated with mining. Captain James Pollock, who took charge of 2nd Army Mining School, was a Professor of physics at Sydney University. He designed the geo-telephone (16) for underground listening of which several were made. In addition, within the Australian Mining Corps, Captain Stanley Hunter was the inventor of a boring machine he called the 'Wombat'. This was powered by compressed air and was mainly used for drilling 61/2-inch diameter holes under enemy galleries for the purpose of demolition (17). As galleries became longer the need for air became paramount. Initially, after much older, noisy pumps had been discarded, air supply was provided by a large pair of bellows connected to a given length of pipe and was taken down to the face by the tunneller. This meant that a man had to keep pumping the bellows for an entire 8-hour shift and air supply became a problem as such men tired. This system was replaced with electric pumps of the 'quiet type'. Perhaps one of the most practical tools was tubing. This consisted of a series of steel rings that could be interconnected and driven into the ground where water or running sand was a major problem and allowed a shaft to be sunk to a depth where tunnelling could begin in earnest.


A major problem for tunnellers was gas. Following an explosion of a mine or camouflet (18), carbon monoxide would be produced and would linger within a gallery. Undetectable by either sight or smell this would prove fatal to a miner if exposed to its effects for too long. Once a mine or charge had been fired tunnellers had to enter the gallery affected as quickly as possible. Tunnellers wearing "proto" sets - special breathing apparatus - entered the mine first to inspect the damage or to rescue any men who may be trapped. To this end men were selected and sent to the Mine Rescue School to be trained in the use of this equipment and in rescue techniques. However, gas often lay in trapped pockets only to be released when the atmospheric pressure equalised. To help combat this and to give the men underground advanced warning of carbon monoxide, mice were initially used as they are sensitive to its effects. The mice were later replaced with canaries as they showed much greater sensitivity to the gas and, providing the bird's claws were pared they would fall from their perch, thereby giving much earlier warning than the mice (19). If the canary's claws were too long then it would grip the perch in an attempt to withstand the effects of the gas and its value as an early warning device would be worthless as it would give false indications to miners resulting in unnecessary deaths. Therefore, in a direct way the life of a tunneller 'depended on the length of a canary's claws (20). Despite such precautions miners still lost their lives due to the effects of gas, as a report by 171 company clearly illustrates. On 18 April 1915 following the explosion of a camouflet on an enemy gallery two sappers descended into the gallery without orders and lost their lives as a result of asphyxiation (21).


Tunnellers not only undermined enemy positions but also constructed dugouts and underground chambers which housed telephone exchanges, battalion headquarters and provided a staging points in which an assaulting force could wait in relative safety and secrecy before an offensive. The most elaborate of these was the complex of tunnels in the Ypres salient around Mount Sorrel. To aid such tasks and given the nature and conditions of war on the Western Front, geology came to play an important role, particularly in regard to mining. Geology was used to aid mining in a number of ways. Firstly to determine whether of not mining was at all possible in a given area due to underground conditions; to gain, in advance, information of the type of material that would be encountered and the depth to which mining could be carried out; and by calculating the latter it would be possible to estimate the length of time needed to complete a given mining objective (22).


The importance of geology as a military aid does not appear to have been fully envisaged by the British General Staff during the early stages of the war. The Germans on the other hand had recognised the value that geology offered and had 20 geologists on the Western Front in early 1916. By the end of the war this number had risen to 100. The British by contrast had only 3 by mid 1918. However, there were also a number of qualified geologists serving with the tunnelling companies who could bring their talents to bear at a localised level. Two junior officers serving with the Australian Mining Corps were temporarily transferred to G.H.Q in October 1918 to help prepare geological maps (23). Despite the disparity in numbers the British were first to organise a geological staff and although this was rather small they were aided by the fact that 'the geology of Northern France and Flanders is not very complex' (24). The La Bassée Canal is more or less the dividing line between two distinct geological formations. To the north the land is mainly water logged and its composition is made up of 'sandy loam upon beds of saturated sand with occasional pebbles and sometimes shaly stone above blue clay' (25). Although silent working in this area was possible, the main difficulty was with the water. Mining in this type of ground was extremely problematic as in the early stages steel tubing was not available to aid in the sinking of shafts. However, pilling, a method by which close-boarded timbers were driven into the ground before any material was excavated, was used at this time with some success. To the south of the canal chalk appears nearer to the surface. The problems this brought was the difficulty of silent working, as the chalk had to be chipped or in some cases blasted away.


Whatever the difficulties, most tunnelling officers at least knew the overall objectives of mining and its strategic use, even if G.H.Q. in the early days, did not. At its most basic, the purpose of mining was to undermine the enemy's front-line fortifications and in turn prevent him from doing the same. Mining therefore, as Captain Graham of 185 Tunnelling Company outlined, was governed by four main factors. 1.The importance of the position to be attacked. 2. The distance from the objective (although given the close proximity of the opposing lines this was usually taken as read). 3. Its strategic use (morale and attrition). 4. The conditions on the ground. The tactical aim was in placing and exploding a mine at the moment of attack with the objective of gaining the greatest benefit in terms of surprise and demoralisation (26). This latter objective became possible to a much greater degree from the beginning of 1916 with the reorganisation and centralisation of the tunnelling force and the beginning of offensive mining on a larger scale towards more clearly defined objectives in conjunction with other arms. The significance of mining within a wider strategic framework was realised on 7 June 1917 with the successful assault on the Messines Ridge (27) that met all its objectives with comparatively few casualties. The Messines operation was the crowning point and finale of the tunnelling force, which had been bought through bitter experience and much innovation on the part of the men since the beginning of 1915. However, many trials awaited them before June 1917.


_______________________________________________________________________________


(1). Barrie, Alexander. (1961). War Underground. London. Tom Donovan. P. 24.

(2). Brig.-Gen. Edmonds, Sir J. E. (1927). Military Operations: France and Belgium 1915. Vol. 1. P. 33.London. Macmillan.

(3). Capt. Grant Grieve, W and Newman, B. (1936). Tunnellers. London. Herbert Jenkins. P. 25.

(4). Professor Branagan, David, 'The Australian Mining Corps in World War 1', Proceeding Australian Institute of Mining, Mineralogy and Metallurgy. Vol. 292. No. 9. December 1987. P. 41.

(5). W. B. R. King, 'Geological Work on the Western Front', The Geographical Journal, Vol. 54. No. 4. July-
December 1919. P. 201.

(6). Grant Grieve. P. 26.

(7). Barrie. P. 26.

(8). Brig.-Gen. Edmonds. Vol. 1915. P. 29.

(9). Harvey became Inspector of Mines in Jan. 1916, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General.

(10). Dir. Mike Fox. Foxy Films and Parapet Productions. The Underground War. Channel 4. (1998).

(11). Ashworth, T. (1980). Trench Warfare. London. Macmillan. P. 200.

(12). Barrie. P. 32.

(13). Grant Grieve. P. 73.

(14). At this time the British had three armies in France.

(15). Grant Grieve. P. 73.

(16). Not to be confused with the French made 'geophone', which will be discussed later.

(17). Branagan. 'Australian Mining Corps', P. 43.

(18). This was a small charge placed inside a gallery with the intention of collapsing an enemy counter-mine without breaking through to the surface.

(19). Bryan Frayling, 'Tunnellers', Royal Engineers Journal,Vol. 102. No. 2. August 1988. P. 171.

(20). Grant Grieve. Tunnellers. P. 322.

(21). WO 95/335. 171 Tunnelling Company RE. 18/4/15.

(22). Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. F. Rose, 'Geology in War', Royal Engineers Journal, Vol. 92. June 1978. P. 184-5.

(23). Rose, 'Geology in War', P. 182.

(24). King, 'Geological Work on the Western Front', P. 203.

(25). Grant Grieve. Tunnellers. P. 40.

(26). Capt. Graham, H. W. (1927). The Life of a Tunnelling. Company Hexham. J. (printer). P. 8.

(27). This operation will be discussed in detail in chapter 3.
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RE: Mining Operations on the Western Front **Article** Part 4
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Opportunity for Breakthrough




During the 'first phase' * of mining on the British and Commonwealth side, operations had been defensive and local in nature, with the notable exception of the Hill 60 offensive in April 1915. The experience bought during this period enabled the British, not only to equal German mining efforts, but also to exceed them, culminating in the largest and most successful mining offensive of the war at Messines in June 1917. The success at Messines was the high water mark of the Tunnelling force and showed their worth as an effective fighting organisation when used in a wider strategic sense in co-operation with other arms. During the 'muddled' nature of the command structure of tunnelling companies until its reorganisation in early 1916, some opportunities may have been lost and others squandered. In examining whether or not mining offered the possibility of a breakthrough earlier in the war before greater defence in depth rendered this unlikely, then a further look at the conditions prevalent at the time and also at some of the mining offensives that were undertaken will be necessary.


The first mining offensive made by British tunnellers was against Hill 60 in the Ypres salient early in 1915 †. Hill 60 was the largest of three artificial spoil banks, created from the excavated earth from the cutting in the Ypres Ridge, through which passed the Ypres-Comines railway line. The other two mounds, located on the opposite side of the railway line, were known as the 'Caterpillar', due to its unusual shape, and a conical shaped hill known as the 'Dump'. The German Army had pushed the French from this vital piece of high ground in early December 1914 and from this vantage point commanded Ypres and much of the opposing line. In order to retake the hill French Sappers had commenced mining from one of their front line trenches but had made little progress by the time the British took over this part of the line at the beginning of 1915 (1). It was decided to continue to mine the hill from three shafts designated M1, M2 and M3, the latter being the original French attempt, and each of the galleries split to form pairs and packed with gunpowder and guncotton (2).


The mines were fired successfully on 17 April 1915 and an artillery bombardment of the hill and surrounding area preceded an infantry assault. Initially the operation seemed a complete success but as the day wore on and the Germans reorganised themselves it became apparent that 'a costly tactical blunder had been committed' (3). The hill pushed into the German front line and was now exposed to heavy artillery fire from two sides and from the Caterpillar nearby. It seemed at first that the German artillery was firing wildly but this was due to the fact that they did not have their guns ranged on 'what had been their own hill, and anyway shelled behind the line chiefly with a view to catching our reserves and preventing reinforcements coming up' (4). The British position on the hill became untenable and, under such fierce bombardment, the use of poisonous gas and almost continuous counter-attack, it was finally lost on the 5 May with the loss of 100 officers and 3,000 men (5). That the mines themselves were a success in not in question. The operation as a whole, when compared with the offensive against Messines two years later, 'was on too limited a scale' (6). Greater success may have been achieved if the 'Caterpillar' had also figured in the assault. The capture of this elongated mound would have denied the Germans' this position from which they were able to subject the British forces occupying the shattered hill to continuous enfilade fire. The reasons for this omission may be due in part to the command structure of the Tunnelling companies that was in place at this time ‡, and the lack of value some senior officers placed in the use of mines in a wider strategic sense.


The fighting on the Western Front during most of 1915 was of necessity limited in nature and those offensives that were made were on narrow fronts. The first major assault was a combined offensive on a much wider front involving French and British troops which commenced on 25 September. The British objective was to be the 'low ground of the Loos sector' to the left of the French attack at Artois. Despite the fact that the nearby town of Lens was a mining area 'mining was to form no part in the preparations for battle'. The only mining undertaken was that in front of Hooge in the Ypres salient, some considerable distance to the north. Four mines were fired here in an attempt to attract attention away from the battle about to commence in front of Loos (7). The preliminary artillery bombardment was lacking due to the shortage of ammunition and the use of poisonous gas was largely ineffectual as it blew back on British positions in certain areas. Nevertheless Loos was almost a success. In some places small units managed to break through the last German line of defence and 'German headquarters as far back as Douai prepared for a hasty departure' (8). The majority of the attacking force, which had a seven to one advantage, was lost at the German first line of defence. Had the firing of a number of large mines preceded the assault then the outcome might have almost certainly been different. In the event the area was only given over to mining once the battle was over.


The use of mines to aid an offensive on a much larger scale came with the Battle of the Somme on 1 July 1916. Much had changed since 1915. Douglas Haig had replaced the Commander-in-Chief, Sir John French, who had not been a great advocate of mining. Haig, on the other hand, saw the potentialities mining had to offer in aiding a major offensive. The Tunnelling Force itself now had a direct voice at GHQ through the newly appointed Inspector of Mines, Brigadier-General Robert Napier Harvey. Harvey decreed, in the first of his 'six-point overhaul of tunnelling procedure', that 'there was to be no offensive mining unless it formed part of a thought-out military operation involving the use of surface troops also' (9). It was decided therefore, that mining would form part of the coming offensive on the Somme and five tunnelling companies were given over to the task of preparing eight large and eleven smaller mines to be ready for firing just prior to the assault by the infantry ±. Besides mining the Tunnelling companies also had to provide 'Russian saps' Ŧ to be driven out into no-mans land to be used as communication trenches once the battle had started. Despite such short notice - only three months had been given - the mines were ready before the date given for the offensive to begin. Once again the mines, with the exception of one, were fired successfully. The offensive however, was the biggest disaster in British military history to that date with almost 60,000 casualties on the first day, half of them within the first hour, with some 20,000 men killed


Arguably the biggest tactical mistake was the premature firing of the large mine beneath Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt. This was fired at 7.20; ten minutes before the attack was due to commence. The original plan had called for all the mines to be fired two minutes before zero at 7.28 in order to take full advantage of the confusion the mines would cause. The decision to fire the mine early was taken by the local corps commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston. Initially he had planned to fire the mine four hours before zero with the objective of rushing and securing the crater in order to give covering fire once the main assault began. The time lapse, he argued, would also give the impression that this was an isolated assault, adding to the surprise of the main offensive when it began. The Inspector of Mines, Brigadier-General Harvey, thought the plan 'mad beyond belief'. The Germans were far more successful at rushing craters, 'as Harvey had sorrowfully noted, not one major mine-crater had been effectively held by the British' (10). Despite Harvey's protests that the original plan be adhered to it was eventually decided that the Hawthorn Ridge mine would be fired ten minutes before zero.


The mine was a complete success. The 'Redoubt itself was utterly destroyed' (11) and three sections of the German 119th Reserve Regiment had been killed in the blast with many more buried in their dugouts. A section of Lancashire Fusiliers raced to occupy the crater but, as Harvey had predicted, the Germans managed to get to their side first. More significant is that the early firing had alerted the Germans of the impending assault and they were now in a position to repel it. The Russian Saps that had been constructed by the Tunnelling Companies were not used as intended. This was due to poor staff organisation. The saps had been constructed in secrecy and many of the attacking troops did not learn of their existence until after the disaster of the first day had overtaken them. Tunnelling Officers well forward into no-mans land, under cover of the saps, observed wave after wave of reinforcements struggling in vain across the bullet swept landscape while an advance in relative safety was but a hundred yards away and had begun in their own front line. In those places where the saps had been used runners, reinforcements and supplies were delivered to their destination with very few losses (12). The official historian gives another factor in the failure of the Somme offensive to reach its first day objectives: 'though many mines were fired, they were too much scattered up and down the front to produce a noticeable effect on the enemy' (13). Given the length of front, the amount of notice given and the numerous other tasks that the Tunnelling Companies had to carry out, of which only five were allotted to the Somme region +, the tunnellers did all that was asked of them. Time perhaps was an important factor. Given more time, as with the Messines operation, the mining operations on the Somme may have produced the same kind of results that the former did a year later.

The year 1917 witnessed a series of allied offensives on the Western Front, the bulk of which were undertaken by the B.E.F. These were: Messines (June) followed by 3rd Ypres (July), Cambrai (November) and to set things rolling the battle of Arras at the beginning of April. Arras was planned as diversionary operation to draw German reserves north from the main offensive by the French on the Aisne. The new French Commander-in-Chief, General Robert Nivelle, claimed that artillery techniques he had developed during the Battle of Verdun, along with massed reserves, would produce a breakthrough in the German lines within 48 hours. Although the offensive failed to live up to Nivelle's claims there was one notable success; the capture of Vimy Ridge , a stretch of high ground approximately nine miles in length, to the North of Arras. The British had taken over this sector of the front in the spring of 1916 at the request of the French following the German onslaught at Verdun. An advanced party, containing Frederick Mulqueen, the commander of 182 tunnelling company, discovered that the front line defences were 'little more than shallow mine craters linked by mean straight-line trenches' (14). The French had attacked and taken the northern tip of the ridge in September 1915, a feat widely publicized at the time. However, the situation had been reversed prior to the British take over but this fact had not been made known. Clearly the tunnelling companies had their work cut out.

The tunnelling companies in the Arras sector were straight away thrown onto the defensive, the Germans already having established a definite system. The British were also hampered by the unfamiliarity of the French system they had inherited. The French had been using a system of "rambling tunnels" that had been in place for many years and had had some successes against the Germans using this system. Discussions with Captain Mulqueen's French counter-part however, revealed suspicions that German miners may already be well forward in this sector. The mines in this system were also difficult to enter and in certain instances were well forward and exposed with some entrances having been severely damaged and narrowed by shell fire (15). In addition, Mulqueen feared that the Germans may stumble on these uncharted, ready made tunnels in the same way the French had done and cause greater problems for the incoming British forces. Shortly after his visit to this particular system the whole of one gallery was destroyed by a heavy German camouflet, a taste of things to come.

A mining stalemate followed a period of fierce activity that culminated in a local German offensive, the result of which was the lost of much of 182 company's mining system at the end of May, forcing them to begin constructing seven new galleries from the new front line. From June onwards there was a fall off in German underground activity. Such a drop in activity, argues Grant Grieve, should have alerted the intelligence sector to the possibility that German pioneers were engaged elsewhere. Hindsight showed that they were actually busy fortifying the Hindenburg line. There was also the fact that by the end of 1916 the blockade was beginning to bite hard on the German economy which had forced the recall of some 125,000 miners from the army to bolster the work force at home. The drop in German mining activity in this sector meant that more tunnelling companies could be employed in the construction of infantry subways, Russian saps and underground assembly areas in preparation for the coming offensive. It was this work by the tunnelling companies that proved invaluable to the success of the Vimy operation. On the whole of the Arras front over half of the assaulting battalions were able to take up their starting positions at the last minute from the relative safety of the tunnels and caves created by the tunnelling force (16).

The lessons of 1916, particularly in artillery developments and techniques, became clearer and were applied during 1917. More than twice the number of guns were arranged along the Arras front than had been present on the Somme on 1st July which had a longer front. The preliminary bombardment was for a longer period - three weeks - and the targets more selective. As well as bombarding the front line trenches and wire entanglements, road junctions and other key points in German communications were also targeted on a regular basis along with ammunition and supply dumps, dugouts and machine-gun emplacements. There were, however, certain strong points that were situated in artillery-proof dugouts which if left would cause heavy casualties to the Canadian divisions ear marked for the assault. Initial planning had called for some twenty-six strong points in front of the four attacking divisions to be destroyed with mines.

The corps staff planners were concerned with the affect that further mining would have on the movement of the assaulting force. A visit to the Somme battlefield - arguably the most heavily mined sector on the Western Front - put their minds at ease as local commanders explained that the craters there were easily traversed on a regular basis by raiding parties and patrols by the British and also by the Germans. Within the four miles of the front that the Canadian divisions were to attack there were some nineteen distinct mine crater groups that had been fired by the British, French and German miners and it was concluded that in all but four of these groups the craters would pose no problems to movement. Despite this, local Canadian commanders were not convinced and believed that further mining would only add to the problem of movement particularly in keeping up with the creeping barrage intended to protect the infantry advance (17).

The initial plan had called for twenty-six large mines in support of the operation. Following discussions with his subordinate commanders the GOC, Sir Julian Byng, heeded their concerns and the offensive mining operations were reduced. 'Four mines were abandoned due to technical difficulties, two were detonated before 9 April for defensive purposes, five were fired as planned, eight were prepared but not used and seven others, though mentioned in the earliest stages of planning do not appear in subsequent tunnellers' war diaries as having been undertaken'. Arguably, the hardest task was in the area of the 4th division. The objective was Hill 145 which was well defended by a heavy machine-gun emplacement in a German redoubt that had been nicknamed the Pimple. This emplacement had been selected for destruction, along with a mutually supporting position in le Bois de Givenchy, just north of the Pimple, by two large mines. However, work had been halted on these mines due to technical problems. The mine being driven towards the Pimple was collapsed by the corps own heavy artillery that fell short of its intended target. The shallow depth of the tunnel in general and the concentration of shell-fire in that sector forced the abandonment of the operation and the mine was duly closed. The second mine was abandoned when it seemed that it would not be completed in time. 'On the morning of the attack, that tunnel was only 100 feet from its target' (18). Ironically it was this sector that proved most difficult. Had these mines been in place and fired it may be argued that the losses would have been greatly reduced and made the advance of the 10th and 11th Canadian infantry Brigades much easier. Nevertheless, three mines were fired in the assault of Hill 145 which enabled the 73rd battalion to seize the farthest rim of the newly formed craters which gave a strong defensive flank for the 72nd and 38th battalions attacking from the south. Although the general offensive as a whole failed, this limited objective operation had secured for the allies an important piece of high ground. There were some seven miles of tunnels and subways constructed in the Arras sector in a period of four months. It was possible for the assaulting troops to travel two miles from Arras and appear at the German front line in safety. It was this feat, along with the construction and firing of several mines at the moment of the assault, that was an important contributing factor to the success in the capture of Vimy Ridge.


The mining of the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge on the 7 June 1917 was a preliminary offensive to the larger Battle of 3rd Ypres. Its objective was to seize and hold the high ground that the ridge had provided for the Germans, while at the same time straightening the forward bulge that pushed into the British line in preparation for the much larger battle that was to follow. Initially the Ridge was to be mined, as part of a secondary attack in 1916, should the Somme offensive fail. The commander of the 2nd Army, General Sir Herbert Plumer, was asked to prepare plans for an offensive in the Flanders area to that end. The idea of mining the Ridge was originally conceived in May 1915 by Major J. Norton Griffiths, the man most directly responsible for the formation of the Tunnelling Companies. Initially his plan was rejected because of its lack of detail. Along with Harvey he produced a revised plan which involved the use of deep mines, between 55 to 125 feet in depth, along the whole of the German Front from Hill 60 in the north down to Factory farm in the south. This was designed, not simply to blow the top off the Ridge but to create an artificial 'earthquake' that would shake the Germans off. Mining at this depth would not only produce the desired effect but it would also prove difficult for the Germans to detect the work being carried out beneath them. The fact that only one of the twenty-two mines constructed was destroyed is, perhaps, testament to this theory. The plan was eventually approved by G.H.Q. and was to form part of the secondary operation outlined above. The confusion of the Somme offensive - that the battle was being won - and the numerous reserves required maintaining the offensive meant that the secondary offensive in the Flanders area was cancelled.


Although the Flanders offensive was called off, preparations were continued as General Plumer concluded that an assault on the Messines Ridge would have to take place sooner or later. Indeed, mining in this sector had commenced as early as 1915 when General Allenby, then in command of V corps, ordered a deep mining offensive directed towards Hill 60 and the Caterpillar (19). In all 21 mines were prepared and ready for firing by the 7 June, of which 19 were actually fired. The length of the galleries in many of the mines exceeded any that had gone before. Some began 500 yards behind the British front line and pushed on towards their German objectives, the total length of which was anywhere from 1,000 to 2,000 feet, branching to form one, two or three chambers each filled with an average of 40,000lbs of explosives. The result was a combined explosive power of some one million tons. In fact some of the mines had been in position for over a year and there was the fear that these older mines might have deteriorated by the time zero hour came or that enemy counter-mines may discover them. Constant checking of wiring and explosives had to be carried out and listening parties strained for signs of an approaching enemy mine. The Ridge itself had been heavily fortified with concrete blockhouses and pillboxes (20) over a wide area; therefore, accurate surveys had to be carried out in order to ensure that these defences were destroyed when the mines were fired. 'This was made possible by using an excellent series of aerial photographs specially taken for the purpose' (21).


Like the preparations for the Somme offensive, here too the Tunnellers were engaged in other preparatory work. While a mixture of British and Commonwealth Tunnelling Companies, British, Canadian and Australian *1, were engaged in maintaining completed mines or hastily completing those as yet unfinished, other companies were engaged in the construction of huge mined dugouts. Also 'numerous subways were made, some 15,000 feet of gallery being provided' in all (22). Both constructions were undertaken to provide protection and to enable the concentration of the attacking force in relative secrecy.


Designed as a 'single-action bite and hold' operation, to be 'closed down' as soon as its limited objective had been reached (23), the Battle of Messines illustrated how far the B.E.F. had come in its tactical and strategic planning since the Somme offensive in 1916. It was an all-arms operation of which mining played a vital part. There were also some 2,338 artillery pieces covering a front of just over nine miles, augmented by 304 large trench mortars, giving an approximate concentration of fire power of 'one gun to every seven yards of front' (24). Tanks were massed in the rear ready to roll forward once the mines had been fired. However, such was the force of the mines, the accompanying artillery barrage and the destruction of strong points so total that the tanks were not needed. Of the 21 mines prepared, General Plumer decided not to fire the two southern most charges as he deemed these too far south to be useful to the attack. Nevertheless he ordered them prepared just in case they were needed. Following the German Spring Offensives in 1918 the exact location of these two mines was lost. One exploded in 1955 during an electrical storm but caused little damage; the position of the remaining mine is still unknown.


At 3.10am on the morning of the 7 June the mines were fired. The surprise on the part of the German Garrison was complete. So enormous was the blast that it was clearly audible in London 130 miles away. German soldiers panicked further down the line believing an earthquake had begun. The extent of German casualties' cause by the blast of the mines was not officially recorded. 'But by the end of the battle, 10,000 of their own men were missing (besides known dead) and 7,354 had been taken prisoner - many so dazed that they hardly knew who or where they were (25). The demoralisation of the Germans on the Ridge was such that little resistance was offered. The attacking infantry, expecting a hard fight, was almost unopposed. The whole of the Ridge and the villages of Messines and Wytschaete were in British hands by 9.00am with comparatively few losses. Following waves of infantry crossed to the ridge without having to fight. However, this produced serious overcrowding on the crest and made easy targets for the Germans. It was only at this point that any serious casualties occurred. So rapid had the operation been that later the same afternoon the 3rd Canadian Tunnelling Company, who had prepared and fired four of the southern most mines, began work on repairing the Wulverghem-Messines road (26), with many more companies engaged in repair work and in consolidating the new front-line defences.


The success of the mines at Messines was due to a number of factors. 1. The mixture and weight of the charges within each chamber †. 2. The depth of the shafts and the length of the galleries, producing greater destructive power and relative secrecy from detection. 3. The length of front covered, almost ten miles, and the number of mines used. 4. The extraordinary length of time between the completion and firing of some of the mines, 'due to the cancellation of the 1916 offensive, the original scheme having been partly completed' (27). The destruction of the German strong points, and the complete demoralisation of the defenders allowed the infantry to cross the normally bullet swept expanse of no-mans land to take their objectives with a fraction of the casualties that would almost certainly have occurred without the use of mines prior to the attack.


Messines was the last mining offensive of the war. The British and Commonwealth tunnellers, after a shaky start in December 1914, had finally overcome their German counterparts and had in effect mined them to a standstill. What did the future of mining now hold? It was largely hoped that such a system of warfare would never occur again. The Inspector of Mines, Brigadier-General R. N. Harvey, stated while giving a lecture to trainee Royal Engineers in 1929: "if you are in a position of responsibility in the next big war, do everything you can to prevent mining being done . . ." (28). One volunteer Tunnelling Officer, Capt. Frayling, following the advice of a senior regular officer, had considered remaining in the Royal Engineers at the end of the war, although he would revert to his substantive rank of second lieutenant. He could not afford the peacetime pay that a subaltern earned and had no private income. However, he stated that 'the deciding factor was that I was told there would be no peacetime tunnelling companies' (29). The only reference to mining came from the former head of the mine rescue school, Lieutenant-Colonel Dale Logan, in 1938. He suggested that deep dugouts should be prepared, similar to those that housed the attacking troops at Messines, to provide shelter against possible air raids.


_______________________________________________________________________________

* This is taken as being from formation until the reorganisation of the Tunnelling force in January 1916.

† At this point mining was commenced by miners recruited from the Monmouthshire Regiment and these men became absorbed into 171 Tunnelling Company along with the first contingent of 'Clay Kickers' in early April 1915.


(1). Grant Grieve. PP. 51.

(2). The official history states that there were two pairs and one single mine prepared and fired during this operation. However, 171 company records state that there were in fact 3 pairs driven and fired. WO 95/335. See also appendix 4.

(3). Barrie. P. 63.

(4). Cave, N. (1998). Hill 60: Ypres. Barnsley. Leo Cooper. P. 21.

(5)Brig.-Gen. Edmonds, Sir James. E. (1927). P. 170.

(6). Brig.-Gen. Pennycuick. 'Hill 60 and the Mines at Messines', P. 391.

‡ See previous chapters.

(7). Terraine, J. (1982). White Heat: The New Warfare 1914~1918. London. Leo Cooper. P. 188.

(8). Grant Grieve. P. 70.

(9). Barrie. P. 136.

Ŧ A Russian sap is a shallow covered tunnel designed to give shelter to attacking troops.

(10). Barrie. P 224.

(11). Grant Grieve. P. 124.

(12). Grant Grieve. PP. 126-127.

(13). Brig.-Gen. Edmonds, Sir James. E. (1927). P. 77.

+ 174, 178, 179, 183 and 252 companies.

(14). Barrie. P. 175.

(15). Barrie. P. 176.

(16). Boire, Major Michael. 'The Underground War: Military Mining Operations in support of the attack on Vimy Ridge, 9 April 1917'.

(17). Boire.

(18). Boire.

(19). Grant Grieve. P. 209.

(20). Oldham, P. (1998). Messines Ridge. Barnsley. Leo Cooper. P. 63.

(21) Brig.-Gen. Pennycuick, 'Hill 60 and the Mines at Messines', P. 392.

*1 171, 250, 1st Australian, 1st and 3rd Canadian.

(22). Grant Grieve. P. 238.

(23). Griffith, P. (1996). Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack 1916-18. New Haven and London. Yale University Press. P. 86.

(24). Liddell Hart, B. (1930). History of the First World War. London. Pan. P. 324.

(25). Barrie. P. 260.

(26). WO 95/336: 2nd Army Troops. 3rd Canadian Company.

(27). Grant Grieve. P. 245.

(28). Barrie. P. 260.

(29). Frayling, 'Tunnellers', P. 176.

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RE: Mining Operations on the Western Front **Article** Part 5
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Conclusion




British mining operations on the Western Front began life with outdated and antiquated equipment, poor organisation and a complete lack of understanding on the part of many senior army commanders as to its value as a weapon of war given the conditions that prevailed. Only slowly was it realised the contribution that mining could provide when used in a wider strategic role rather than in small, singular, tactical operations that typified most of 1915. However, although the early stages brought about questions as to the contribution mining had to the war effort, this was a period of learning for the organisation as a whole.


While the British were slow to recognise the utility that geology offered, not only to mining operations, but also in the location of water supply and the excavation of raw materials, the Germans were not and had a large number of geologists on the Western Front. By comparison the British had only three by mid 1918. However, these were extremely able men in their field and were aided by the simple geological make up of the region and by the fact that many men serving with the tunnelling companies themselves had expertise that could be used at a local level. The British were also quick to establish a geological staff and were able to act and advise tunnelling companies in a more direct way.


The reorganisation of the tunnelling force at the beginning of 1916 resulted in a restructuring of command and greater continuity than had existed during the previous year. With the reorganisation came mining schools to give instruction on tactics and a mine rescue organisation that gave training in the use of special breathing apparatus in order to save those trapped more efficiently without further loss of life. Mining became so effective following the reorganisation that in an attempt to regain the initiative the Germans restructured their own organisation along similar lines to that of the British. Equipment improved dramatically to meet the problems that the tunnellers encountered. Electric air pumps dealt with the problem of air supply as mines became deeper and the galleries longer, while water pumps dealt with flooding in galleries. Specially designed metal tubing was also devised to help sink shafts through water logged and problematic ground. Arguably the greatest aid was that given by the geophone. This relatively simple device gave early and accurate warning of an approaching enemy counter-mine which allowed British tunnellers, more often than not, to destroy the enemy's gallery first.


The psychological effects of mining were immense. Far more soldiers on both sides feared being undermined that those that were actually killed by the mines themselves. The tunnellers faced the added problems of falling foul of an enemy charge bringing down the gallery in which they were working and often the danger that they would break into a counter-mine where frequently combat would ensue in the confining space below the ground.


The high point was, of course, the complete success at Messines. Without the use of mines prior to the assault huge casualties, similar to those inflicted on the first day of the Somme offensive, would have almost certainly been the result. The 19 mines that were fired not only destroyed all the strong defensive points on the ridge, but also affected German morale to the point where they could offer no effective resistance. The vital differences between the assault at Messines and the Somme offensive was that mining for the latter was not considered as vital as that of the former. Artillery was to produce the step by step advance and mining was seen more of a diversion than that of eradicating the first line of defence, thereby allowing the infantry to gain a reasonable foothold with few casualties. Even so there were many mistakes that were not of the tunnelling companies' making. The early firing of the Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt mine, against the advice of the Inspector of Mines, was clearly a tactical blunder. It did not obtain the objective, which the Corps commander who had ordered its firing had hoped for. The German infantry had gained a foothold on their side of the crater that was formed and were in a position to harass the British infantry on the other side. Yet another problem was poor staff planning. The Russian saps that had been prepared by the tunnelling companies were not used effectively. The majority of the infantry that crossed no-mans land fully laden did not learn of their existence until much later because they had not been informed of their positions or their intended use. Had these been used as intended then these men could have crossed to within 30 yards of the German front line in relative safety. Time was yet another factor. The five tunnelling companies involved on the Somme were given only three months to prepare the mines that would be used on the 1 July. The front was in excess of 16 miles compared to a little over 9 miles of front at Messines and the mines and aggregate of explosives, with some exceptions, were not as large.


While many general accounts give some space to mining operations as they occurred before the commencement of a particular battle, such accounts do not convey sufficiently the problems that tunnellers encountered in completing these mines. What they also fail to highlight is the absence of mining in preparation for an offensive. The omission of mining at the Battle of Loos, an area ideally suited to mining, is largely ignored in historical post-mortems when considering other possibilities that may have produced a battle winning formula. The vast majority of casualties occurred at the first line of defence and the battle of Loos was no exception. The fact that some units succeeded in penetrating the last German line of defence, leaves open the question of what more could have been achieved if a number of large mines had been fired prior to the assault? Ironically the area around Loos was only handed over to tunnelling companies after the battle's conclusion.


Britain began mining operations at a considerable disadvantage. The Germans had already commenced mining on a pre-defined system while the British struggled to answer them in the early stages. Yet by mid 1916 there were 32 British and Commonwealth tunnelling companies at work within an organised framework, that not only met the German challenge, but took the lead which would remain with them until the end of the war. Following Messines no further offensive mining took place on either side. Tunnelling companies during most of 1918 were engaged in other duties, particularly the dismantling of boobytraps, the repairing of roads and bridges and the sinking of wells for water supply.


Despite the eventual success of the tunnelling companies no peacetime organisation was established. The reasons why are not exactly clear. There were many infantry commanders who, even at the end of 1917, did not agree with the use of mines and who were in a position to prevent the continued existence of the tunnelling companies. Also the majority of those engaged in mining were volunteers who were due to be demobilised as the war ended. The size of the peacetime army was greatly reduced and many senior officers had other conflicting ideas. Some looked forward to a more mechanised force that entailed new tactics, while others still looked to the infantry as queen of the battlefield. Mining was laborious and unglamorous and has not attracted the attention that other branches have in equal proportion. Nevertheless the contribution of mining to the war effort, given its less than auspicious start, was immense. Providing shelter and protection for the infantry the tunnellers' career ended with a spectacular success, which saved many lives in obtaining the objectives set out. British and Commonwealth Mining Operations on the Western Front 1914-1918

-- Edited by Tim R at 19:46, 2007-01-23

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RE: Mining Operations on the Western Front **Article** Part 6
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Clay-kicking


Clay-kicking was a method of civilian mining that was used in cities to aid in the installation of utilities such as elcectric cables and water pipes and also use in the driving of drainage systems and sewer works. the miner sat in a small gallery or tunnel with his back supported by a wooden cross (which also explains why it was also know as "working on the cross") and used an implement similar to a spade but with a much smaller, thinner blade and was referred to as a grafting tool (see illustration below). Above the head of the grafting tool were situated two foot rests which the miner used to push the tool into the clay face. It derived its name due to the fact that the subsoil of most towns and cities in the uk are, more often than not, made up of clay and the movements made by the miner in carrying out this work resembled a kicking motion.

The main difference between military and civil mining, which is described in some detail by W. Grant Grieve (1), is the type of gallery created. In civil mining the gallery is all important as this is where the minerals are extracted. they must, therefore, be large enought to allow several men at any one time to work and move the minerals over considerable distances by rail trucks to the surface. In military mining the gallery is simply a 'means to an end' in that the objective is to reach the enemy position and place an explosive charge underneath him. The size of the gallery in this instance is usually only of dimentions that will allow the work to be carried out quickly and efficiently.



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Here are a few photos that go along with the article.

All the Best

Tim R



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RE: Mining Operations on the Western Front **Article** Part 1 of 6
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The original clay kickers were men who worked on the Manchester sewer system in the 19th century. The term spread to include tunneling in other cities. Clay kickers were still at work in the 1970s, my father (who was a civil engineer) employing two to assist in tunneling through a motorway embankment to lay a North Sea gas pipeline without disrupting traffic. Although this was near Manchester by this time the two clay kickers were Irish and could command, what was for the time, substantial wages. They only worked in the summer - returning to Ireland for most of the year.
Clay kickers from Manchester (probably already in the army) were assigned for the digging of the Messine Ridge mines.

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Use of mines in trench warfare from the French school of St. Cyr (1917) French Manual (english)
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The following notes on Use of Mines in Trench Warfare are published for the information of all concerned.wink

Can be found here free download Use of mines in trench warfare : from the French school of St. Cyr

Cheerssmile 

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RE: Mining Operations on the Western Front **Article** Part 1 of 6
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The author's name is Neil Ashworth - there's a slightly more organised version of his paper at http://homepage.ntlworld.com/neil.ashworth1/Index.html.

I'll try to contact him for permission to republish in Landships II.

Regards,

Charlie



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