It seems like that the french gun was superior to the german in almost all respects
1-range 2-RoF 3-Projectile size
only the FK96nA was lighter and supposedly more mobile, but did this crusing superiority in french artillery translate into more german battlefield casualties and more french victories in early months of the war ? Esp since at that time it was a war of movement where the disadvantages of the french 75 like its lack of elevation should not have been too much of a problem.
How much worse was the 77 as compared to the 75 ? some comparisons I have heard seem to suggest that a battery of 4 75s was equal to 3 batteries of 6gun 77s ? it seems like this comparison is between the old FK and not the modernized one
1. Round in 1914 & for much of 1915 the FK77 nA 96 used the Krupp Universal Round - a combined HE & Shrapnel round. While not the unmitigated disater it could have been it was distinictly mediocre at best, generally a poor performer.
2. As a consequence of its lightness the FK77 nA 96 has accuracy problems, it is rather notorious for variability - bit like the Mk 5 Jungle Carbine & its wandering zero!
The major issue in effectiveness though is & will always be employment & the armies tactics & stance. Here the adoption of plan 12/17 puts the French right in the cess pit. While being on the strategic offense the Germans frequently got to exercise tactical & sometimes operational defense - maximising their higher count of artillery. To make it worse this situation minimised the French Corps structure in respect of artillery! French divisions have only 2/3rds of the artillery directly that a German division has. Things a rebalanced significanly by 1/3rd of a French Corps artillery being in its Corp reserve (they are till out numberred significantly but its only 10% to 15% not over 30%). The next issue is the increased weight of the German artillery, a 1/4 of its Field artillery is 105mm Howitzers & German Corps are both much more likely to have their attached 150mm Howitzers but also have more of them.
Where the French employed the designated tactics for plan 11 - staged withdrawls in an over bounding way covered by predeployed artillery - then looking for tactical & operational counterattacks with point supierority the whole position reverses & the Germans get realy mauled. These are the circumstance on which the French 75's capabilities are maximised as are the French armies structural set up & actually the great bulk of their unit tactics. The sad fact is plan 11 would have had the Germans walking into virtually a French trap - It was based on an almost physic evaluation of the Schlieffen Plan & the French had spent a decade with it as the basis of their war planning & training! As it was failures (perhaps better put as the wide divergence of achievement & talent) at Army & Corps level walked the French into a right thumping in the battle of the Frontiers. At the High command level the Frech actually got about 2:1 Corps superiority & then blew it! Often some of their worst mauled units were the best - they got exposed by those who did not do their job or follow orders. Equally the Germans regularly got bailed out by superb performances by their Divisional Commanders! At Corp level they were really mediocre but that ment they kept a better front & effectively got better co-ordination. French performance at Corps is generally Good or Bad - so the Good often got left in the lurch!
To make it worse this situation minimised the French Corps structure in respect of artillery! French divisions have only 2/3rds of the artillery directly that a German division has. Things a rebalanced significanly by 1/3rd of a French Corps artillery being in its Corp reserve (they are till out numberred significantly but its only 10% to 15% not over 30%). The next issue is the increased weight of the German artillery, a 1/4 of its Field artillery is 105mm Howitzers & German Corps are both much more likely to have their attached 150mm Howitzers but also have more of them.
But to keep things in perspective , a german corps only had 16 15cm howitzers and 36 10.5cm howitzers
while the french corps had 120 75mm guns
in sheer numbers the 75 outnumber the howitzers considerably, esp in the war of movement in 1914.Obviously i am not talking about the combined arms tactics of germans which were intially superior to french
My basic question is in a one to one comparison was the german 77 so bad that it took 3-4guns of its kind to equal the firepower of one french 75 ?
-- Edited by nastle on Thursday 25th of March 2010 11:25:16 PM
48 guns a division = 96 all 75's 48 guns corps reserve all 75's Supposed to have 2 batteries of 155mm but almost all did not - 8 guns IF present.
Total either 144 guns (or rarely 152 guns) for the Corps
Germans
54 Field Guns a division = 108 of the FK 77 18 Field Howitzers a Division = 36 of the lFH 105 16 Heavy Howitzers a corps = 16 Sch FHB 150mm
Total 160 guns for the Corps.
While the 77 is decidely mediocre - no it is not as bad as 1/3rd or 1/4 as good as a 75, perhaps 1/2 as good in the circumstances that best suit the 75. Here again though the German Artillery was GENERALLY better handled so mostly battery for battery was equal!
I was reading "kaiser's army" by erin brose and it seems like the superority of german artillery was a myth according to the author.He regularly dismisses the artillery handling as mediocre and alleges even that the numbers for the german heavy artillery are wildly exaggerrated.
e.g in footnote 115 he claims that french corps had only 92 guns but it compensated and was superior to 144 guns of the german corps
again in 116 he says that french heavy artillery was superior than german in 1914 ( first time i heard that) to back it up he gives 24 x 120mm and 30 x 155mm batteries which were mobile and moved with the field army. I think french army had 104 x 155 and 84 x 120 total in aug 1914.
For german heavy artillery he gives 10 detachments ( without giving totals) and says all of them were old 1893 models. I am reasonably sure germans had 112 x 210 in field armies and 80 more in mobile siegesome m batteries.Furthermore like u said the 150 ( modern recoil ones) in field armies alone number over 400.And there were some more in siege batteries as well. At the very least german heavy howitzers outnumber french by 3 to 1 , not counting the 10.5cm LFH or the old weapons without recoil.
Suspect if he matches German Reserve Corps against French & excludes German non QF systems it might work. This of course is interesting as these systems in both French & German armies have positional reciol systems & the great proportion of French Mediums & up are like this.
The Germans tested captured M1897 in 1915. They agreed that the French gun had better accuracy and range than the FK96nA. Their main points of criticism were: Protection of crew inferior because of smaller shield; too heavy for manhandling; only three gunners can travel with the cannon, the rest must be transported elsewhere.
The FK96nA remained in service throughout the war, in 1917/18 even a new production line had to be set up for it. It was the only field cannon - apart from the special Infanteriebegleit guns - that could be manhandled; thus, all artillery regiments retained at least one battalion of FK96nA for the purpose of accompanying the assaulting infantry.
The FK 96 n.A made a fairly useful direct fire anti-tank gun as well. Special shells were developed for this role - the shell would explode after penetrating the armour.
Gentlemen, When comparing the M1897 & FK96/nA it is important to consider the former was a purpose built design while the later was not. As has been noted several times in this forum over the years, the FK96n/A was a hasty improvision of an existing piece which the army was forced to "make do" with.
For all the "shock and awe" writers habitually heap on the "75", they rarely consider all the facts. Firstly, rapidity of fire can not be sustained for lengthy periods of engagements; the laws of metallurgy will soon come into play as any competent gunner will attest to. Thus a more practical rate of fire for prolonged barrages made the two systems relatively equal.
Secondly, the "75s" alledged greater range is theoretical; it could not be practicalluy achieved during normal battery deployment. The carraige design simply prevented it.
Finally if I be so bold to say, Brennan's first entry in this tread is the most accurate assessment of early war field gun employment I have read to-date, and deserves a re-read if you missed it. The Plan 11 tactics when put to use by retreating French divisions were highly effective. This was the most consistant excuse 2nd Army gave for lagging behing the march table.
-- Edited by 28juni14 on Friday 26th of March 2010 01:57:47 PM
-- Edited by 28juni14 on Friday 26th of March 2010 01:58:21 PM
Many thanks for the confirmation I have put my reading to some use. Since being bitten by the Great War Bug I have invest mucho Dolleros & Mucho Time in thrying to get past the "crap that every body knows & ain't anything like true".
The key is generally the peformance of the formations - NOT the hardware. Perhaps the classic on this is the drubbing that some Austro- Hungarian frontline units took from 3rd line Serbian Units - the middle aged geezers mostly equiped with single shot black powder rifles, no machine guns & obsolete French de Bange system artillery (no recoil compensation etc). Why - well 1st their CinC used them appropriately (either defensively with time to prepare OR in the sort of crap terrain that they knew!! Terrain that suited their skills, tactics etc & made life hard for the Imperial & Royal Units); 2nd the units were never hung out to dry by being unsupported; 3rd the expeience & learings of 2 wars was WELL learnt & applied; 4th these troops & their officers had worked for this & didn't make silly mistakes!; 5th & finally the Austro-Hungarians were really dumb & did commit some bad atrocities (basically the Bosnian & Hungarian units) almost from the begining so the Serbs were really motivated!
For all the "shock and awe" writers habitually heap on the "75", they rarely consider all the facts. Firstly, rapidity of fire can not be sustained for lengthy periods of engagements; the laws of metallurgy will soon come into play as any competent gunner will attest to. Thus a more practical rate of fire for prolonged barrages made the two systems relatively equal.
Secondly, the "75s" alledged greater range is theoretical; it could not be practicalluy achieved during normal battery deployment. The carraige design simply prevented it.
Thanks for contributing, can you recommend a source where I could read more about these aspects of the french 75
-- Edited by nastle on Saturday 27th of March 2010 06:59:03 AM
-- Edited by nastle on Saturday 27th of March 2010 06:59:32 AM
Ian Hogg's Allied Artillery of World War One is as good a place to start as any.
As an aside in extended bombardments the rates of fire of QF & non QF guns are quite close. This is a result of the need to preserve the guns - faster rates mean hotter guns equalling accelerated wear! Personnel fatigue do to the long periods handling the ammunition & the guns. Finally Non QF systems in prepared battery positions use a wide range of techniquies to return the gun to battery withou having to heave it!
Long duration rates of even 1 round a minute are very rare even for 'short' mid WWI bombardments of a few days! Note 1,000 field gun rounds (with packaging approx 25+ tons per field gun so well over 150 tons per battery) is less than A day at 1 round a minute! Almost 1,500 tons for just a divisions integral field guns - excludes its howitzers & the volumes of Corps & Army artillery required.
First, sorry for my poor english language! I think that the Ian Hogg's books are very great and "classic" for the study of english and german artillery but not for the study of the french artillery.The french artillery chapter of "Allied Artillery of World war One" is often erroneous, especially for heavy artillery study but also for the field artillery use. I recommand a french book: -Général Gascouin "L'évolution de l'artillerie pendant la guerre"-Flammarion 1920- which depict french artillery use with the full experience of a commanding officer of Artillery in three "Divisions d'Infanterie" and in one "Corps d'Armée" later in the war. For the study of french field Artillery, the small modern book of my friends François Vauvillier and Pierre Touzin "Les canons de la Victoire 1914-1918-tome 1 -L'Artillerie de Campagne" is very precise and contain many details on artillery use. Yours sincerely, Guy François.
