Landships II

Though  I unfortunately have had to change careers I was originally trained as a historian, so I feel I have some background to react on this interesting question.

Consensus on the Tank seems to be it had little impact on the actual outcome of WW1. If I'm not mistaken the excellent documentary "Tanks, wonder weapon of WW1?" states the same. Why is this? First of all, we have a somewhat twisted view of WW1 as being the killing ground of the trenches first and foremost. In fact, trench warfare was bloody indeed, but the loss rates on the battlefield were the highest in the opening and closing months of the war, when the armies had moved into the open field. The reason for this is that the techniques of Warfare had developed at totally different speeds, and WW1 was so to speak "the War that came too soon". Firepower was on a very modern footing indeed, mechanized to such an extent that the production capacities of Britain, France and above all Russia at first could not cope with the demand. Not only Artillery, but also the personal firearm had improved in range and rate of fire dramatically. Thus, a quickly trained single Vickers machine gunner had a rate of fire 100 times or more of the most experienced Rifleman at Waterloo a mere century earlier. Yet, at the same time transport on the Battlefield itself was no faster than in Caesar's days, being mostly on foot and on horseback. The resulting slaughter was predictable and caused the entrenching of both armies, which resulted in the Stalemate that made this war so seemingly endless.

Now, did the Tank break through all this? It is true that is could breach lines, but it proved too experimental and too vulnerable (both technically and militarily) once it got through, and incapable to capitalize on the gains made. If asked which Allied military improvement did most to win the war I'd say "the rolling barrage". Here the British above all learned to turn the disadvantage all sides had (the tremendous industrial firepower of modern armies) into a weapon they could control. It allowed for the first time infantry to breach and HOLD positions by denying the enemy the time to regroup when a barrage lifted.

The tank touched people's imagination and had enormous potential for morale boosting, but on the battlefield they could -as yet- not make the difference it was hoped they would when they were introduced. When they became faster and more reliable, and when ideas about their use evolved and semi-independent battle-units with their own supply columns developed, the Tank came of age and could make a difference. All that happened (long) after hostilities had ended however, and those lessons were best learned by the Germans.

By the Spring of 1918 WW1 had both sides on the brink of collapse. The fall of Russia gave Germany a last hope in the race against time before the USA came into the war in full force. The troops freed from the Eastern Front gave them a short-lived numerical superiority which they used for their Spring Offensive. This succeeded at first (which according to the above view should have been impossible, as Germany had no Tank force to speak of) and drove the Allies into a wild panic. It was not brilliant military action which saved the Allies, but the wealth of their supplies. When the starved German Army overran the rich stores they started plundering and stopped advancing. More important: the stores brought home the message that all the deprivations had been in vain, as the War seemed to have worn down the Germans but had left the Allies untouched. Or so it seemed at least when the German soldier compared the wealth of Allied stores with his own scarcity of food. It was the wrong conclusion, and had the German soldier known just how wild the panic in the Allied Army was when they broke through, they might just have pulled it off. As it was, the offensive bogged down, the gaps were filled, the opportunity lost.

More important: the German Army and Germany itself began to loose all hope. When the US Army finally entered the War in their millions the last hopes were dashed. There was never any serious chance of Austrian troops coming in in force on the Western front. By 1918 they were trying to find a way to get out of the War behind Germany's back. In fact, ever since the desater at Przemysl it had been the Germans who had to send in troops in force to support the Austrians, not the other way round!

Gradually losing the will to fight by losing all hope for victory (or at least a way to extract Germany from the war in an honorable way) did more than all those Tanks.

Mario

It's claimed that the person who most overstated the Tanks' part in the Allies' victory was Ludendorff, who, after the War, exaggerated their achievements in order to divert attention from the German High Command's failings. This contrasts with attempts during the War to play down the Tanks' significance and point out their many shortcomings so as not to undermine German troops' morale.

On the other hand, the Tanks' achievements and potential were exaggerated in the British, French, and American press in order to boost Allied morale.

The truth lay somewhere in between, as is often the case.

The paradox is that the Tank pioneers who advocated holding back until a mass, "breakthrough" attack could be launched, and who tried to resist the use of Tanks in "penny packets", were wrong, at least in 1917 and 18. Cambrai and Amiens demonstrated that you could not undertake a blitzkrieg with such slow and unreliable machines, and, which is not often mentioned, negligible air support. Twenty years later, with speeds increased by 400% and more, it was a different proposition, and the tactics worked.

The practice which emerged of using small numbers of Tanks, working in close support with infantry to overcome specific obstacles was exactly the right one for the circumstances. Until there could be huge technological improvements, the mass attack had to remain a theory.

The contribution of the Tanks has been summed up in more or less these terms:

The Allies were going to win the War anyway. What the Tanks did was enable them to win the War with far fewer casualties than would have been sustained without them.

If you'd like to read some views on the subject, try A Peripheral Weapon? : The Production and Employment of British Tanks in the First World War by David J. Childs, and A New Excalibur by A.J. Smithers. Rather different books, but both excellent.

I've seen T.A.P.W. for $85, but, yes, it is an expensive book. It's an academic work, obviously not intended for a big print run. Luckily I have a friend in the book trade who got it for me at cost price.

Excalibur is an excellent book, very entertainingly written and sometimes highly amusing. It covers all the salient points, but is very uncritical of Albert Stern, giving him a somewhat heroic status.

T.A.P.W. is much more formal in style and technical in content. Don't be put off by the fact that there is an entire chapter entitled "Sprockets". It follows the same chronology but deals with several aspects which Excalibur doesn't; for example the physical problems of moving hundreds of 30-ton Tanks across the Channel and around France. It also has a lot more to say about Stern's sacking by Churchill.

In an ideal world I should read both and combine the two accounts. I found Excalibur in hardback at a model fair for £10, and came across the paperback in a second-hand bookshop in London for £5. Of course, you can always put your library service to the test.

Needless to say, in both of the above there are no more than a couple of sentences on the subject of Estienne and the French.