Landships II

Thanks for your reply, Lothianman. I agree that the book portrays Haig in a very dim light; I think it was referred to in a later book which I read last year, though I forget what that book was. Possibly 'Somme', perhaps one of a boxed series of four books (mostly IWM books) covering the Live and Let Live system, the whole war on the western front, and the one I can remember the title of - 1918: Year of Victory.

Certainly the book has challenged my tendency to think (from rather limited knowledge) that Haig has been dealt with harshly by posterity, but I suppose it is not so much the treatment of the man himself, but what Winter's research suggests about the general understandings of the war that strike me.
He seems to have good reasoning in his arguments that many battles differed in concept from what we are normally told, eg the Somme, which history books tell us was about breakthrough, but Winter says was always intended as an attrition battle to divert the Germans before mounting a breakthrough attack in Flanders, with further attacks pushing from the coast and an amphibious landing which foreshadowed the proposed Operation Hush of the following year.

I haven't yet looked on Amazon to see what criticisms are made, and I'm not sure if this (the above) is the sort of thing you mean when you say the book is not well done as history; a large part of Winter's argument is not just that Haig tried to make himself look better to history, but that, perhaps because Haig published his account before an official understanding on the war was reached, the version of events passed down through history - the version which most books will tell - is not accurate, giving us the view that the French caused many problems which they were not responsible for, that their army was not very good, when Winter gives the impression that it was better trained, better organised, perhaps better equipped, and tactically superior to the British army of the day; also that the German successes of March 1918 against Gough's army were partly caused not by poor preparation as I read last year (probably in "1918: Year of Victory"), but because the attack was expected and a German-style tactical retreat was planned, ready for a counter-attack - except the scale of the German assault was much greater than the British expected, overwhelming them.

As for the common view that the Germans were on the back-foot from Amien onwards in 1918, that the Last Hundred Days was a bit like the inevitable allied push to victory in WW2, Winter makes interesting points when he describes the German retreat as very orderly - worryingly so to the allies - and looks at the strength of the German army during these critical times.
I would have liked to see some analysis of the actual strength of divisions, rather than just the numbers available quoted - to see if his claims that the German army was still strong, strong enough to hold on for some time yet, were true, or whether the divisions were actually lagging seriously in numbers of men and the number of divisions available masked that fact.
Nonetheless, the idea that Germany was on it's knees food-wise and militarily in 1918 seems questionable according to Winter, so it seems that the armistice was not, or at the least, not necessarily, a premature end to a foregone conclusion, but indeed an unsatisfactory finish to a war which was not conclusively won.
That much is surely why, nearly a century on, many people continue to take a relatively simplistic view of WW1 as a tragic waste fought for nothing, and thus would rather look back on WW2 with its proper victory and sense that something was achieved; the relative states of WW1 and WW2 modeling, often compared on this forum, must owe a lot to this view.

As to Winter himself, the blurb in the copy I have have borrowed says that he studied at Cambridge and worked as a schoolmaster in London; nothing conclusive about nationality, but I suggest it's best to assume him British unless anyone else knows better.

Many thanks to the last two comments - plenty of food for thought (though I still want to know what people think of the idea that Haig effectively forged the primary historical documentation, not just misquoted it).

But, to follow the intriguing what-if discussion: I'm slightly surprised that the three (in my opinion) best serious discussions of counterfactual history known to me which explore the what ifs of the Great War (amongst much else) don't consider this option in detail, of the USA staying out, on a very quick check (Niall Ferguson, Virtual History; Robert Cowley, What if and More What if - the accompanying book What if America also ignores this, if I recall rightly; Andrew Roberts has also edited a book in this vein but although it is interesting it gets a mark down from me as it is spoilt for the thinking reader by having to un-see it through the very blue filter of his political views). 

The books tend to focus on the UK staying out, or (if the BEF did go in) on an earlier, pre-1917/8 armistice of desperation. Perhaps things had gone too far, and fallen into the hands of more ideological/political commanders like Lloyd George and Ludendorff who had too much to lose personally by being seen to "surrender" after the people's armies had suffered massive casualties, to be retrievable by an armistice in 1917-18.

One point, though, is the impact of the influenza epidemic - often ignored (or forgotten with a shudder) by survivors both military and civil, but a bigger killer than the war worldwide, and not to be ignored as an agent of exhaustion of the armies even when people survived. The flu histories make terrifying reading, not least in the lethal, almost plague-like impact the flu had especially on young and active adults. It does seem to have perhaps originated in the American midwest, as such, and was certainly incubated very effectively by the huge camps of the US mobilization and training system (but, to be fair, Etaples has also been fingered). To the extent that European outbreaks were due to (or at least accelerated by) the massive transport of soldiers from this US outbreak into the European theatre, then this would be a very real if unintended effect of the American intervention, quite separate from a single American getting to the front line. It might have shortened the war due to increasing exhaustion, but how, and whether it affected one side more than the other, are interesting questions, complicated by the complex history of the epidemic and the evident changes in the virus with time; the American training camps do seem to have given the evolutionary pressures that made the virus evolve into its second and very nasty form. Maybe they would have been better staying at home and growing food to keep Europe fed, U-boats permitting.

 I really must read up even more on the Great War ...!

 

 

The "alternate history" genre is endlessly fascinating - with an early armistice would communism have prevailed in Russia? Certainly the foundation for national socialism in Germany would have been undermined. So many turning points, a fractal universe of possibilities no historian, not even the (fictional) Hari Seldon could unravel or predict - therefore endless grounds for conjecture. But some historians enjoy being controversial, I am sure - their road to riches and freedom from the pall of anonymity I suppose. I don't know about Winter, I need to know more about his sources and substantiation. All too often we see a thesis full of fancy and prejudice dressing a skeleton of disarticulated and selective quotation of unsupported primary and secondary sources and splenetic myth. Mine is a jaundiced view, certainly, but I suspect it is hard to make an honest living as an historian - and holding this view without doing the hard work to prove it makes me every bit as morally reprehensible as the worst of "them". Ah, there is no peace for a lazy man.

The "Spanish flu" pandemic. Yes, it must have played havoc with the plans to repatriate troops to the USA, Canada, Australia, etc. I recall hearing that some incoming troop ships to Fremantle, Western Australia, spent months in quarantine on arrival. I am haunted by the memory of that corner of the Fremantle Cemetery which is filled with troop graves with post-war dates. Hmmm ... if memory serves correctly most of those were 1920, even later, too late for the flu' then? Much dark knowledge still to be gained, it never stops.

Morgoth wrote:

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It's not a question of a lack of a clear victory. It lacks the good vs. evil thing of WWII.

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 You're right about the good vs. evil thing, but I believe the lack of a clear victory is also valid: had there been one, people could say that their sons/ fathers/husbands/brothers died/were maimed to win a long and brutal war; there is at least a degree of worth about their sacrifice.

With an unclear ending, millions have died, millions more been injured, the land ravaged and many left in sorrow, without apparent benefit. Both cases hold.

TinCanTadpole wrote:

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...That any help?

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Yes, thanks, certainly shows he did his homework and exhibited a proper concern about sources.  So did Bean yet he was also very much in the business of "myth-making" through being a trifle selective/subjective - always more concerned with the big picture. 

It may even have been Denis Winter who wrote a short article once (wish I could find it) in the AWM journal "Wartime" about Bean's underplaying of the significance of 3 Section, 3rd Field Company, Australian Engineers being the first AIF troops to go into action (almost 3 months before Gallipoli).  Newspaper article: http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/full-coverage/8681712/our-heroes-of-el-qantarah/.  Mostly it was the Indians and Kiwis involved admittedly, but still the AE were the FIRST of the AIF.

Anyway, avoidance of slavish acceptance of secondary sources (even Bean when it comes to ANZAC history) is certainly a huge step in the right direction.  Winter has to be taken seriously then.

A different story but of course Bean's (and Murdoch's) utterly improper attempts to influence the selection of the Commander of the Australian Corps in 1918 shows just how far an historian/journalist can stray from the true course of his profession.  It is a confusion of omnipresence with omnipotence.

-- Edited by Rectalgia on Tuesday 28th of February 2012 08:25:43 AM

Morgoth; by benefits I mean victory and the sense that something worthwhile has been achieved - such as the defeat of a nation that was threatening the balance of power and likely to gain in international might, to the detriment of peace; as seen from contemporary British viewpoint.
The Versailles treaty indeed shows that the politicians believed Germany beaten, hence the excessively harsh terms. Haig himself apparently was not as convinced; another quote from Winter:

"As late as 19 February 1919, when Edmonds dined at Haig's London home and studied the situation map for 11 November, Haig asked him quietly, 'Why did we win the war?' " (p221 of Penguin edition)

I've been given the impression before now that the war ended rather inconclusively, that it was questionable why the allies won rather than Germany; more recent reading has given a different impression, with the tale of the Last Hundred Days etc.
All we can do is read and try to evaluate the arguments and research of the authors, and decide if we agree with them or not. Since I've heard a similar line before (though from what source I've no idea) and Winter's research appears to have been thorough, I'm inclined to think he has a point. Incidentally, I understand at least one of the American staff thought the war should have been continued to a military conclusion, and Winter makes reference to politicians/soldiers reckoning (correctly, more or less) that a lack of military victory would lead to war again in/within 20 years. Anyone know who that American/those Americans were?


Rectalgia; must have a look at that link when I have a moment; there are lots of theatres of the war about which I know little, even including Gallipoli - although my knowledge of that beats my knowledge of Gaza, Africa, and the Balkans, which is almost non-existent.
I agree, Winter should be taken seriously - if not completely over Haig (he must have had more good qualities than this book suggests?), then certainly over historical events.

That's interesting; I suppose then that unless some other historian is prepared to investigate the historical claims made by Winter and publish his/her findings that we are left with having to return to the 'safe' ground of the accepted history of events.

There are indeed some interesting ideas put forward - and one would hope that at least some are correct - concerning the intent behind the Somme battle, the reasons for weakness in the Third/Fifth Army (can't remember which one) sector in spring '18, the possibility that Germany was only temporarily weakened in Autumn that year and could have fought on longer had they chosen to.

If Winter is correct in any of these suggestions, but if Grey too is correct in saying that Winter got other things wrong in his quotations, etc, it would be a shame for the potentially correct claims to be disregarded on account of inaccuracies elsewhere. Not being able to assess these matters myself, I can only say that I hope someone who can will clarify things and let us know if indeed we should hang onto and pass on the generally accepted history of the war, or if certain ideas should be binned and a fresh perspective taken.